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Abstract
Behavior analytic researchers have used single-case designs to evaluate variables at
multiple levels of analysis. In this thesis, three analyses of voter turnout were conducted
with single-case design. The first analysis used a multiple-baseline design to evaluate the
effect of compulsory voting on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. The second
analysis used scatterplots to evaluate the effect of the density of registered voters to
polling stations on turnout within constituencies in parliamentary elections. The final
analysis used a repeated A-B design to evaluate the effect of the duration of party control
on popular vote for nations in which two parties receive the majority of votes. The
discussion addresses the future use of these experimental tools with aggregated behaviors
produced by groups. Further, the findings are linked to current understandings of
behavior principles, which reveal several avenues for future behavior analytic research
with political phenomenon and policy.
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Introduction and Literature Review
Behavior analysts have many analytic tools to evaluate behavior and its
controlling relations. These tools are arranged into three broad categories: indirect,
descriptive, and experimental (see Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007). Indirect tools
organize information reported by other observers to aid formulating a functional
behavioral relation. Descriptive tools operate similarly to indirect tools, except
information is gathered directly by the investigator. Experimental tools systematically
manipulate one or more variables and measure any changes in one or more behaviors.
Experimental tools offer the greatest confidence in detecting relations between variables,
and direct and systematic replication further strengthens findings.
Behavior analysts also select behavior analytic tools that appropriately match the
level of their analysis (Meazzini & Ricci, 1986), which is primarily concerned with the
individual organism. At the individual level, researchers specify whether their interest is
molecular (i.e., a single instance of a behavior) or molar (i.e., the demonstration of a
behavioral repertoire over time). The group level of analysis aggregates the responding of
several subjects; the group is the subject (Dallery, Cassidy, & Raiff, 2013; Hayes &
Fryling, 2009). Groups can be investigated in isolation (within-group analyses) or in
comparison to other groups (between-group analyses). Organizational levels of analysis
may use individuals or groups as subjects—the difference is that this level captures
behaviors that interlock to bring about a product. Organizational analyses may be either
process (i.e., the analysis of behavioral chains and their products) or system (i.e., the
analysis of all processes and their effects) level (Austin, 2000).
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Analytic tools may be appropriate at one level of analysis but inappropriate at
other levels of analysis. However, some tools and levels of analysis have been reasoned
to be more or less appropriate for some behavioral phenomenon (e.g., Baer, 1977). This
discussion is not concerned with drawing limitations for any given analytic tool. Rather,
the following invites readers to considering using one particular tool for both individual
and group levels of analysis: interrupted time series designs.
Behavior analysts have extensively used interrupted time-series designs as an
experimental tool to evaluate relations among phenomena (see Barlow, Nock, & Hersen,
2009). Interrupted time-series designs use frequent and repeated measurement of the
dependent variable(s) before, during, and sometimes after an investigator systematically
introduces and withdraws an independent variable. These designs allow investigators to
test for functional relations between phenomena. Interrupted time-series designs can be
used at both individual and group levels of analysis. The dependent measure at the
individual level of analysis is the individual’s response, whereas the dependent measure
at the group level of analysis is aggregated responding. The term single-case or singlesubject design has emerged to describe interrupted time-series designs used with
individuals (Cooper et al., 2007); however, the single-case can be used to describe
interrupted time-series designs used with groups (Kazdin, 2011), in that the aggregated
responding of the group is treated as one single phenomenon or single-case (Dallery,
Cassidy, & Raiff, 2013; Hayes & Fryling, 2009).
Single-case designs come in many varieties, though three standardized designs
have emerged: the reversal, alternating treatments, and multiple baseline design
(Kratochwill et al., 2010). Reversal designs include, at minimum, three phases of
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intervention: baseline (i.e., no presence of the independent variable), intervention (i.e.,
the introduction of the independent variable), and reversal (i.e., return to baseline). For
example, Reynolds, Dallery, Shroff, Patak, and Leraas (2008) demonstrated the lasting
effects of a web-based intervention for prolonging cigarette smoking abstinence by
frequently measuring the carbon-monoxide levels in participant’s breath before, during,
and after intervention. Some choose to implement a fourth phase—the reintroduction of
the independent variable—to better demonstrate a functional relation of the independent
variable and the dependent measure. Larson, Normand, Morley, and Miller (2014) used a
fourth phase in a reversal design to demonstrate the effects of teacher interactions during
physical education on increasing the number of minutes that students engage in physical
activities.
Alternating treatment designs rapidly alternate two or more different experimental
phases with different independent variables to compare their effects on a dependent
measure. As an example, Fogel, Miltenberger, Graves, and Koehler (2010) rapidly
alternated two independent variables for four students participating in physical education
in a public school gymnasium: (i) regular physical education led by a teacher and (ii)
exergaming (i.e., games played through electronic entertainment systems that require
players to exercise as part of the game) activity stations, and measured corresponding
effects on, (i) minutes of physical activity and (ii) opportunities to engage in physical
activity. The dependent measures revealed that all participants engaged in more physical
activity during the exergaming condition and that exergaming presented more
opportunities for children to engage in physical activity.
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There are instances where the independent variable cannot be withdrawn, and in
those cases, it is recommended that investigators use a multiple baseline design (Barlow
et al., 2009). Multiple baseline designs systematically stagger the introduction of an
independent variable across people, behaviors, or settings (Kratochwill et al., 2010). For
instance, Stokes, Luiselli, Reed, and Fleming (2010) systematically implemented
differential feedback across multiple high school football players, holding each in
baseline until time could be sufficiently ruled out as a variable influencing change in the
dependent measure. One key element of the multiple baseline design is that the baselines
must occur at the same time—failure to sync up the baselines will result in a loss of
control that is typified in this design (see Harris & Jenson, 1985a, 1985b; cf. Hayes,
1981, 1985).
Each of these three single-case designs have been used to evaluate a wide variety
of socially significant phenomena among individuals, including (but not limited to)
developmental disabilities (e.g., Cuvo, 1997), childhood physical activity (e.g., Fogel et
al., 2010; Larson et al., 2014), pathological gambling (e.g., Guercio, Johnson, & Dixon,
2012; Johnson, & Dixon, 2009), substance abuse (e.g., Dallery, Raiff, & Grabinski, 2013;
McDonell et al., 2012; Reynolds et al., 2008; Silverman et al., 2007), and enhanced
strategies for sports coaching (e.g., Boyer, Miltenberger, Batsche, & Fogel, 2009;
Osborne, Rudrud, & Zezoney, 1990; Smith, & Ward, 2006; Stokes et al., 2010),
abduction prevention (e.g., Beck, & Miltenberger, 2009; Poche, Yoder, & Miltenberger,
1988), and public school education (e.g., Greer, 2002; Vargas, 2009). Further, these three
single-case designs have been used to analyze other socially significant phenomenon
when measuring the responding of groups, including (but not limited to) hand washing
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(e.g., Fournier, & Berry, 2012), hospital safety (e.g., Cunningham, & Austin, 2007;
Stephens, & Ludwig, 2005), traffic safety (e.g., Clayton, Helms, Simpson, 2006; Jason,
Neal, & Marinakis, 1985; Schulman, 2005; Van Houten, Hilton, Schulman, & Reagan,
2011; Van Houten, Malenfant, & Rolider, 1985; Van Houten, Van Houten, & Malenfant,
2007), recycling initiatives (e.g., Conner, Lerman, Fritz, & Hodde, 2010; Keller, 1991;
Larson, Houlihan, & Goernert, 1995; Ludwig, Gray, & Rowell, 1998), organizational
behavior management (e.g., Austin, Weatherly, & Gravina, 2005; Fineup, Luiselli, Joy,
Smyth, & Stein, 2013; Rice, Austin, & Gravina, 2009), sexual transmitted disease
prevention (e.g., Montesinos, Frisch, Greene, & Hamilton, 1990), demining fields in
Africa (e.g., Poling, Weetjens, Cox, Beyene, & Sully, 2010; Poling, Weetjens, Cox,
Beyene, Bach, & Sully, 2011), and detecting Tuberculosis (e.g., Poling, Weetjens, Cox,
Beyene, Durgin, & Mahoney, 2011). Evidently, single-case designs are flexible to adapt
to a wide range of phenomenon.
The above literature indicates that single-case designs are available to use at both
the individual and group level of analysis; however, some questions may remain about
how single-case design compares to other analytic tools. Turner (1986) partially
addressed this question by evaluating the effects of pornographic imagery on five verbal
and two physiological measures among men using single-case design at the individual
level of analysis and statistical analyses at the group level. The single-case design
revealed that there was a relation among the measured variables at the individual level of
analysis; however, the statistical analyses revealed a weak relation at the group level of
analysis. Turner demonstrated that the phenomenon of interest must be measured at the
appropriate level of analysis with the correct analytic tool; otherwise, incorrect
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conclusions may be drawn. Similarly, Witts, Rzsezutek, and Dahlberg (2016) compared
the findings of single-case design at the individual level of analysis and statistical
analyses at the group level of analysis in an investigation of gambling behavior.
Participants were shown videos of short sequences of slot-machine reels, with each video
displaying a different win/loss/near-miss sequence. After each video, participants were
asked how likely it would be to see at least one winning spin in the next 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5
spins were they to see the next five spins. The single-case design revealed different
response profiles to each video, which was inconsistent with aggregated and statistical
analyses. Statistical analyses detected several significant differences, however, these
analyses were excluded because the results of the statistical analysis did not match the
responses of any single participant.
Further, there are emerging examples from the experimental literature suggesting
that single-case designs may be a more appropriate design for evaluating functional
relations within groups (Berry, & Geller, 1991; Dallery, Raiff, & Grabinski, 2013).
Dallery, Raiff, and Grabinski (2013) used a multiple-baseline design and standard group
statistical analyses to evaluate the effect of vouchers contingency on low carbon-dioxide
levels in smokers. The multiple-baseline design revealed an effect, however, the standard
group statistical analyses revealed no effect. As another example, Berry and Geller
(1991) responded to research suggesting that limited automated reminders have no
significant effects on seat-belt use by employing alternating treatment designs; in
actuality, they do have an effect compared to no reminder in a little more than half the
individuals participating in their study. In each of these studies, statistical analyses may
have led investigators to inaccurate conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the
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independent variable. Single-case designs appeared to better detect the nature of some
effects. These examples corroborate the sensitivity of single-case designs to detect
functional relations, and indicate that single-case design should be used more often to
evaluate measures within groups.
One particular phenomenon where single-case designs may be well-suited is in
evaluations of large groups for the purposes of informing public policy. Behavior
analysts have previously called for a collaborative partnership with those who inform
public policy, given the scientific analyses that are available (Campbell, 1969; Fawcett,
Bernstein, et al., 1988). Behavior analysts have made little progress in this matter
(Mattaini, & Luke, 2014), though efforts are underway (Biglan, 2016; Houmanfar &
Mattaini, 2016). Recently, United States President Barack Obama (2015) issued a decree
that government agencies should recruit behavioral scientists to provide
recommendations on government related processes, protocols, or issues that require
improvement. Shortly thereafter, the Social and Behavior Sciences Team (2015)—a
United States government agency operating on Mr. Obama’s decree—reported the results
of numerous studies related to public policy. Behavior analysts could contribute to such
endeavors, though more behavior analytic research demonstrating how single-case
designs can inform public policy may be necessary to establish the drive for such
organizations to include behavior analysts. Indeed, this kind of research is also in keeping
with the field’s endeavor towards influencing the world for the better (Houmanfar &
Mattaini, 2016; Malott et al., 1995).
Electoral reform is one such area that could benefit from the use of single-case
design to inform policy, and it would be in keeping with behavior analytic ambition to
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target socially significant behaviors (Bear, Wolf, & Risley, 1968; Wolf, 1978). The
casting of votes to elect individuals into a parliamentary assembly (here after simply
referred to as “voting”) can be reasoned to be a socially significant behavior in many
ways. Foremost, consider a government’s role as a controlling agency (i.e., a subgroup of
citizens that function to control the behavior of the entire group [Skinner, 1953]). As a
controlling agency, a government controls citizen behavior by codifying behaviors and
their corresponding aversive consequences in the form of a bill of law. Those holding
positions within government agencies, in this case parliamentary assemblies, influence
those controlling laws. Further, the government as a controlling agency has the ability to
reallocate resources produced by the nation via nature and tax collection. For some, the
reallocation of resources may be favorable; for others, the reallocations may increase the
probability of encountering aversive stimulation. For example, reallocating resources
from the medical sector to welfare is beneficial for those that are unemployed, though
less favorable to those whose jobs are lost in the medical sector. Therefore, for citizens,
the opportunity to vote is an opportunity to indirectly decide what behaviors that will be
followed with aversive consequences if produced by a citizen of the nation and how
resources will be allocated. Without the opportunity to vote, citizens may elect to
exercise other means of counter-control with respect to the government agency, either
through escape,1 revolt,2 or passive resistance.3 Providing citizens with the periodic

An individual’s behavior that removes them from presence of a stimulus change placed within their
environment by a controlling agency.
2
Any aversive stimulus change directed at a controlling agency in response to the controlling agency’s
delivery of an aversive stimulus change directed at the group, e.g., conscription is enforced and then
protests and riots ensue, or monies are reallocated from education to the army and this results in widespread
picketing by teachers.
3
Any behavior produced that does not align with the codified behaviors (Skinner, 1953).
1
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opportunity to vote can be considered an abolishing operation (see Langthorne & McGill,
2009) for counter-control in that it reduces the reinforcing value for such behavior.
Consider the composition of a parliamentary assembly. As a whole, one could
consider a parliamentary assembly as a reflection of the values of a nation. In behavior
analytic terms, this means that electoral ballots function as a reinforcer assessment, in
that the population is provided with an array of stimuli and each individual has the
opportunity to produce the behaviors necessary to vote for the stimulus that they most
value. The aggregated product (Glenn, 1988; Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward, 2010) of
this large-scale reinforcer assessment determines which individuals sit in the assembly.
The outcomes of these assessments influence what kinds of laws the parliamentary
assembly will produce—this is important given that behavior analysis understands
parliamentary assemblies as controlling agencies that outline behavioral contingencies for
individuals within the group (Skinner, 1953). Those interested in a controlling agency
that best reflects the values of the population would understand that a higher number of
electoral ballots (i.e., reinforcement assessments) completed by citizens during an
electoral period is more likely to produce a parliamentary assembly that best reflects the
citizens’ aggregated preferences. Said another way, the more people within the nation
that vote, the better parliament can reflect (i.e., act in accordance with) the values of the
nation as a whole. If parliamentary assemblies are elected with a low number of ballots,
then it stands to reason that they may make decisions that do not reflect the values of the
nation as a whole. For citizens, a large number of votes may avoid the addition or
removal of behavioral contingencies that the group as a whole generally does not favor.
A large number of votes is also beneficial to the government agency as it indicates that
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the addition or removal of behavioral contingencies will be less likely met with
problematic counter-control methods employed by groups (unless the agency deviates
from the values upon which they were elected). Thus, a high number of votes helps
ensure that the values of a group are best represented by the composition of the
parliamentary assembly and it has the added benefit of allowing the governing agency to
maintain overall group control with minimal interruption.4
One present problem with elections is procedural sabotage between parties vying
for control of the governing agency. Suppression tactics are one type of procedural
sabotage used by parties competing to control the parliamentary assembly.5 Journalists
have noted that some voter suppression tactics include robot calls6 that inform citizens
that the day of voting has been changed, robot calls that inform citizens that a candidate
has already won an election, robot calls misdirecting voters to incorrect polling locations,
threats of jail time to non-citizens who vote, challenging eligibility of certain sub-groups
suspected to not support the political party (Bronskill, 2015), and social media posts that
mislead voters to believe that they can vote via text messaging (Hawkins, 2016). It could
be reasoned that political parties use these tactics because a high number of votes may
result in a loss of control over the parliamentary assembly. A lower number of votes may
allow them to maintain control of a parliamentary assembly. Exercising voter suppression
tactics is therefore a means of countering the counter-control of the group. It is unclear if
higher voter turnout would increase or decrease the incidences sabotage. An increase in

4

Although, control by one party may motivate another party to begin attracting voters or altering the voting
processes in their favor.
5
This is achieved by holding the majority of parliamentary seats. A party with the majority of seats has the
ability to pass laws without opposition.
6
i.e., automatically dialed telephone calls with messages read by a computer program.
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votes for one party could serve as an establishing operation for sabotage for another
party. Regardless, the presence of sabotage is, in and of itself, another reason why voting,
and voting as a group, is important for the group as a whole.
If the logical arguments presented in the past two paragraphs have not swayed the
reader to conclude that voting is a socially significant behavior, then consider some
empathic appeals to vote. Empathetic appeals cite the investments that many have made
to ensure that citizens within a democratic nation can continue to influence parliamentary
assemblies. These investments may have been time spent advocating for a democratic
system, skills performed to establish and/or maintain a democratic system, or lives that
were lost during wars between democratic and non-democratic nations. In addition, most
democratic nations have a history of restricting the right to vote to individuals of specific
profiles (World Library, n.d.). Many of the subgroups excluded from voting later sought
for the right to vote and succeeded. In sum, voting is also socially significant because
people at some point valued the ability to counter-control government agencies in a nonconfrontational manner. These people traded their time, efforts, and lives for the right to
influence parliamentary assemblies. For these reasons and others previously listed, a
behavioral analysis of voting has merit given that it is clearly a socially significant
behavior.
There are some examples of behavior analytic research with voting. For example,
Lamal and Greenspoon (1992) described incumbent re-election in the United States
Congress using the metacontingency. Further, Visser (1996) found that voters are most
likely to vote for the same party as proximal others (i.e., those who they frequently
encounter day-to-day, specifically their parents or partners). The largest known study to
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increase voter turnout in a community setting was conducted by Fawcett, Seekins, and
Silber (1988). They observed an increase in the number of registered voters living in
poverty when voting registration was offered at the site of two food banks. While these
analyses are promising, a large-scale group analysis of voting within and across notions is
absent. A search query of “voting,” “elections,” and “turnout” in the Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, The Behavior
Analyst, Behavior Analysis in Practice, The Psychological Record, and Behavior and
Social Issues returned zero behavior analytic studies that had either (i) analyzed current
voter turnout trends (i.e., the percentage of eligible citizens voting across parliamentary
elections amongst democratic nations), or (ii) speculated, tested, and/or observed
effective tactics to increase voter turnout of a large population within an agency (e.g.,
government, business, organization).
There are many behavior analytic tools that can be used to evaluate voter turnout.
The following investigation sought to use single-case designs to evaluate voter turnout.
Variables were not systematically manipulated; rather, post hoc electoral data were
gathered for the purposes of analysis. While single-case designs are typically
experimental, the gathered data were arranged to describe the relations between variables
and voter turnout much like an experiment. In essence, the following analyses capitalized
on previous environmental changes for the purposes of evaluating changes in voter
turnout. Given the descriptive nature of this analysis, one other time scale design will be
used to detect functional relations: the scatterplot. Further, the following analysis sought
to display a few cases where single-case design can be applied to analyze aggregated
responding of groups—in this case, voter turnout. Two standard single-case designs were
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employed. The first investigation combined a multiple-baseline design and withdrawal
design to evaluate the use and absence of compulsory voting (i.e., aversive stimulation to
those who do not vote) on voter turnout across numerous nations where parliamentary
elections periodically occur. The second investigation used scatterplots to investigate
whether there is a relation between the number of polling stations in a constituency (i.e., a
geological boundary whose population vote for a representative of parliament) and the
voter turnout within constituencies. The third investigation used a repeating A-B design
to evaluate the effect of the length of a political party’s time in office on the popular vote
within nations that notoriously observe the majority of votes split between two political
parties.
Analysis 1: Compulsory Voting on Voter Turnout
Method
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for
analysis. Voters were from nations selected from the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistances’ (IDEA’s) Voter Turnout Database (n.d.-b).
Nations were eligible for inclusion in this analysis if they met the following three criteria:
(i) the nation must have held at least one parliamentary election between 1945 and 1955,
(ii) the nation must have continued to hold parliamentary elections at least once every ten
years thereafter until July 2016 (the date of this analysis), and (iii) if the nation displayed
a change in compulsory voting law, then there needed to be at least four elections before
and after the change. These three criteria ensured that there would be sufficient data to
assess, and that there is at least some degree of stability (i.e., four years of consistency
provided stability in the data paths).

19
Dependent measures. Voter turnout was defined as both (i) “estimated eligible
voter turnout,” which was calculated by dividing the number of citizens that casted a
ballot during a parliamentary election by the estimated number of eligible voters within
the nation, and (ii) “registered voter turnout,” which was calculated by dividing the
number of citizens that casted a ballot during a parliamentary election by the number of
registered voters. Admittedly, the accuracy of the estimated eligible voter turnout is
suspect; however, it could be a better indicator than registered voter turnout. Certainly,
there are voters that do not register, and thus, a measure using registered voters produces
an inflated measure of voter turnout. As Saldana (2014) noted, some nations who use
compulsory voting see fewer registered voters. Therefore, this analysis included both
estimated voter turnout and registered voter turnout.
Design. Voter turnout was evaluated using (i) a multiple-baseline design and (ii)
statistical t-tests. The multiple-baseline design was chosen for this analysis given that
compulsory voting could not be directly controlled. This design capitalized on previously
arranged political environments by arranging the data as if conditions were controlled.
This arrangement enables a visual analysis of changes in variability, level, and trend by
comparing changes between conditions within nations, and changes between nations with
differing compulsory voting laws. In this analysis, nations were organized by the
conditions arranged by their governments: those that have not had compulsory voting for
the entire observational period (i.e., A), those that have had compulsory voting for the
entire observational period (i.e., B), those that established compulsory voting (i.e., A-B),
and those that abolished compulsory voting (i.e., B-A). Second, grouped nations were
organized by the percentage of data paths that met the criteria for a “high” level. Finally,
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each nation’s voter turnout was condensed into a straight line to better aid a visual
analysis. Data paths were increased in weight (i.e., bolded) if the data path met the
criteria for “high” level; data points were filled with colour if the election met the criteria
for “high” level.
T-tests were conducted between elections with and without compulsory across all
nations, then specifically between nations that have always or never used compulsory
voting, and then within nations that have abolished compulsory voting.
Procedures.
Data collection and interpretation. Voter turnout data were gathered from
IDEA’s Voter Turnout Database (n.d.-b). IDEA gathers estimates of the number of
eligible voters from statistics reported by the United Nations (Pinter & Gratschew, 2004).
Estimated voter turnout and registered voter turnout were gathered and graphed
separately for each nation. Each graph was visually inspected for variability, level, and
trend (Barlow et al., 2009). Table 1 displays the definitions used for variability, level, and
trend. If the data within a nation appeared to change over time, then variability and level
were analyzed for each component of the data (e.g., “initially low variable ascending
trend followed by a high stable no-trend”). If a trend crossed the high to low boundary,
then it was marked as doing so (e.g., “an initially high stable descending trend followed
by a low stable descending trend”). Outliers were removed from graphs for the visual
analysis.
Summative data regarding the variability, level, and trend of voter turnout were
compiled. If the visual inspection revealed a change in variability, level, or trend over
time (e.g., “an initially high stable descending trend followed by a low stable descending
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trend”), then the most current trend (e.g., “a low stable descending trend”) was included
in the summative data across nations.
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted
between the raw data and files used to generate the graphs to rule out transfer errors.
Correspondence checks were conducted on 33% of the included nations (rounded up).
Nations were selected for correspondence checks by drawing nation names from a hat.
After selection, the raw data was compared to the data in the file used to generate the
graphs. If the data did not match, the data were corrected and the entire correspondence
check was restarted. This procedure repeated until a sample with 100% correspondence
was obtained.
Next, correspondence checks were conducted between the data and the graphical
displays to ensure that scores were accurately displayed according to the design above.
Correspondence checks were conducted on all relevant data for 33% of the included
nations (rounded up). Nations were selected for checks by drawing nation names from a
hat. After selection, the data in the file were compared to the display and the design rules
above. If the display was not accurate, then the graph was re-produced to conform to the
design and the entire correspondence check was restarted. This procedure was repeated
until correspondence was 100%.
Interobserver agreement (IOA) training procedure. A second observer was
trained to conduct the visual analysis for the purposes of evaluating IOA. These second
observers were required to either be graduate students in applied behavior analysis
programs or people holding BCBA or BCBA-D certification to participate as second
observers in this analysis.
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Appendix A contains the materials used to train the second observer. These
materials included, (i) written instructions of the visual inspection method have been
prepared, and (ii) 40 fictitious sample graphs with corresponding evaluations of
variability, level, and trend. Each fictitious sample graph displayed a unique variability,
level, and trend combination.
Once recruited, second observers were first trained to evaluate variability, level,
and trend according to the visual inspection method. Training consisted of behavioral
skills training (Miltenberger, 2012). First, the second observer was given the written
instructions for conducting the visual inspection method. Each component of the
instructions was reviewed vocally with the second observer. Next, four of the fictitious
sample graphs were presented with a model demonstrating how to use the visual
inspection method. The last phase of training consisted of role-play and feedback. During
role-play, the second observer was presented with one randomly selected fictitious
sample graph and then produced a written evaluation of variability, level, and trend.
Feedback followed each written response. Correct responses were defined as producing a
written evaluation of a sample graph, using variability, level, and trend, that matched the
data displayed on the graph. Incorrect responses were defined as producing a written
evaluation of a sample graph that does not match the data displayed on the graph. Vocal
praise followed correct responses, and corrective feedback followed incorrect responses.
Corrective feedback consisted of (i) brief explanations with reference to the written
instructions and (ii) the second observer erasing their evaluation and rewriting their
evaluation. If the second observer produced an incorrect response following corrective
feedback, the corrective feedback procedure was represented until the second observer

23
produced a correct response. Only the first written response was scored for each graph.
Scoring was collected with pencil and paper. The mastery criterion for training was
defined as 90% correct responses across 20 consecutively presented graphs. No criteria
were specified for when to re-evaluate these procedures if an observer did not pass
training.
IOA procedure. Immediately following training, the second observer was
presented with the graphs of 10 randomly selected nations. If the written visual inspection
of the second observer matched at least nine of the written visual inspections of the first
author, then the second observer continued to evaluate the remaining graphs. Otherwise,
the second observer was retrained using the training procedures above. Immediately
following retraining, the second observer was presented with the graphs of 10 randomly
selected nations. If the written visual inspection of the second observer matched at least
nine of the written visual inspections of the first author, then the second observer
continued to evaluate the remaining graphs. Otherwise, the second observer was
dismissed from the study and a new second observer was recruited for training. All
graphs reviewed by second observers were without any labels that may have identified
the nation.
Each written analysis was reviewed immediately after they were produced to
ensure that second observer indicated variability, level, and trend. If variability, level,
and/or trend was missing from the second observer’s analysis, then graphs were represented with a vocal prompt to complete the analysis. Vocal prompts did not address
why the analysis was incomplete, but simply that it was. This procedure was repeated
until the second observer returned a complete analysis of the graph.
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IOA for variability, level, and trend were individually assessed. IOA was
calculated using the Cohen’s Kappa calculation (e.g., Watkins & Pacheco, 2000).
Cohen’s Kappa calculation holds a significant advantage over the regularly used percentagreement calculation (i.e., agreements divided by total possible agreements) because it
accounts for the probability of chance agreements (Watkins & Pacheco, 2000). Kappa is
equal to ((PO – PC) / (1 – PC)) where PO is percent agreement (i.e., agreements divided
by total possible agreements) and PC is the probability of chance (i.e., calculated by
summing the probability of chance for each measure, which is determined by first
determining the product of (i) instances where a given measure was scored by the first
observer or both observers, and (ii) instances where the same measure was scored by the
second observer or both observers, and dividing that product by the total possible
agreements). Kappa measures should be interpreted as follows: less than 0.40 is poor
reliability, 0.40-0.59 is fair reliability, 0.60-0.74 is good reliability, and above 0.75 is
excellent reliability (Cicchetti, 1994; Watkins & Pacheco, 2000). If a nation presented
with two conditions (e.g., with and without compulsory voting, or vice versa) then each
conditioned was individually evaluated for IOA.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 displays the 42 different nations that met the inclusion criteria for
analysis. Of the 42 nations analyzed, 29 nations had never employed compulsory voting,
9 had compulsory voting in effect for the entire period of observation, and 4 had
abolished compulsory voting laws. Table 2 also displays the sanctions (i.e., aversive
consequences) in place amongst nations with compulsory voting laws. Note that there are
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differences in the severity and schedule of aversive stimulation amongst nations with
compulsory voting laws.
Appendix B contains the graphs of voter turnout that were originally prepared for
the visual analyses. Four outlier elections were removed from these graphs and other
relevant graphs for the visual analysis (i.e., Belgium, 1946 estimated eligible voter
turnout; Jamaica, 1983 estimated eligible and registered voter turnout; Trinidad and
Tobago, 1971 estimated eligible voter turnout). Table 3 displays the results of training
observers for IOA. Two observers were excluded from the IOA analysis. Following the
exclusion of the second observer, the IOA procedures were amended to exclude the
fictitious graphs and instead use national graphs with slight manipulations (e.g., the
elections were flipped along the abscissa) when training the third observer (see Appendix
C for these materials). Training for the third observer was terminated due to recurring
disagreements about (i) what qualifies as a variability and (ii) where to separate the
overall data paths when indicate a changing trend. This subjectivity brought about the
following changes to the data interpretation procedures: (i) to eliminate guesswork,
definitions of variability, level, and trend were updated (displayed in Table 4); (ii)
changing trends were removed from the analysis; instead, only the overall trend from the
last 50 years were evaluated in each condition; and (iii) the graphs for the visual analysis
and IOA training were updated to include (a) two “constraint” lines (which paralleled
10% above and 10% below the trends line-of-best-fit), (b) a measure the overall trends
slope, and (c) connected data paths between elections separated by missing data.
Appendix D and E contain the updated materials for the visual analysis and IOA training
respectively. The third observer was recruited once more for IOA and passed testing
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under these revisions. Table 5 displays a comparison of the visual analyses between
observers. Tables 6, 7, and 8 display the agreements and disagreements of variability,
level, and trend respectively. Kappa coefficients were as follows: variability = 1.000
(perfect reliability), level = 0.965 (excellent reliability), and trend = 0.980 (excellent
reliability). Overall, the reliability scores indicate that the observations were adequate
enough to merit reporting the following results.
Figures 1 and 2 display the condensed line graph of the level of voter turnout
across elections within each included nation. Figures 3 through 11 display the level of
estimated eligible and registered voter turnout across all included nations.
Correspondence checks of the data revealed no transfer errors; however, four graphical
errors were detected and corrected. Table 9 displays a summary of the visual analysis of
level and trend across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout. In sum, nations that
have high levels of voter turnout were likely to have maintained or improving turnout,
whereas nations that have low levels of voter turnout are likely to have unchanging or
descending trends. These results were consistent regardless of whether or not the nation
employed compulsory voting laws. Compulsory voting appears to have a greater effect
on the level of registered voter turnout. Table 10 displays a summary of the six statistical
analyses. Two significant differences were found within the registered voter turnout data
between all compulsory and non-compulsory elections, and specifically within nations
that have always or never used compulsory voting.
The results of this visual analysis must be interpreted with careful consideration
of several methodological limitations. Foremost, even though the data were arranged in
an experimental format, compulsory voting was not controlled. For example, it is not
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clear if fines in nations with compulsory voting laws have been consistently issued; there
is some evidence of inconsistent applications of compulsory voting in some of the
included nations (Bódeva, 2013; Irwin, 1974; Shah, 2013). Further, procedural
differences between nations may contribute to the observed levels and trends of voter
turnout. For example, how governments advertise the location of polling stations, how
electoral commissions present instructions within polling stations, and procedural
differences in how nations factor votes into representation in their legislative branches of
government may account for some of the differences between nations. Effect verification
is another concern. Although Figures 1 and 2 display data akin to a multiple-baseline
design, in actuality, only the four nations that have abolished compulsory voting fit the
standard arrangement for a multiple-baseline design. All remaining nations are simply an
extended series of condition A or B. Thus, the effect of compulsory voting or lack thereof
is difficult to verify for the vast majority of nations. What is left is a comparison of
turnout between groups of nations. Finally, strict definitions were required to bring about
reliable visual interpretations of the single-case design. The lack of these strict definitions
and IOA procedures could have left this analysis open to concerns regarding
interpretation. Thus, the functional relations drawn from this analysis must be recognized
as a probable truth and are subject to further analysis.
Limitations aside, confidence is garnered from several other methodological
strengths. The comprehensive and systematic features of this analysis allowed for a more
accurate comparison of voter turnout with and without compulsory voting than analyses
that sample single elections. Further, repeated measures across national elections and
nations provides confidence that the observed variability, level, and trend did not occur
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by chance. The reliability of these observations were verified with the use of strict
operational definitions and inter-observer agreement procedures. In all, this analysis has
brought about an alarming summary: if a nation observes low voter turnout, then turnout
is likely to be unchanging—or worse—deteriorating. Remedies and further consideration
of compulsory voting are taken up in the general discussion.
Analysis 2: Density of Registered Voters to Polling Stations on Voter Turnout
Method
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for
analysis. Voters from nations in analysis 1 were eligible for inclusion in this analysis only
if the nation published federal election measures (i.e., the number of polling stations,
registered voters, and registered voter turnout within each electoral constituency) from
the last three elections on the Internet.
Dependent measures. Voter turnout was defined as the number of votes within a
federal/general electoral constituency divided by the number of registered voters for that
constituency. Polling stations were defined as the number of reported locations where
voters could cast ballots.
Design. Voter turnout was evaluated using (i) scatterplots and (ii) a statistical test
known as regression analysis. Scatterplots were produced for each of the last three
elections for each included nation. First, the ratio of registered voters to polling stations
were determined for each constituency. Then, these ratios were paired with the voter
turnout observed within the constituency. These data were then plotted on a scatterplot
with the ratio of registered voters to polling stations on the abscissa and voter turnout on
the ordinate. R Studio® generated each scatterplot with a line of best fit.
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Next, the scatterplots were condensed into a strip-line plot to allow for visual
analyses between nations and elections. National elections were placed on the abscissa
and ratio of population to polling stations for each constituency were placed on the
ordinate. Data for each election were jittered to aid visual inspection. Finally, each data
point was filled according to a heat-map scheme that corresponded to that constituency’s
voter turnout. Therefore, the “hotter” the fill of the data point, the higher the voter turnout
within that specific constituency.
Procedure.
Data collection and interpretation. Dependent measures were gathered from each
nation’s electoral statistics agency or electoral commission. Data for each of the last three
federal/general elections were graphed separately. Outliers (defined as any data point that
deviates more than two standard deviations from the mean of any related measure) were
removed from graphs for the visual analysis. Then, each graph was visually inspected for
a relation among variables using the direction of the line of best fit. A positive slope or
negative slope indicated a relation; otherwise, a flat line indicated no relationship.
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted
between the online data sources and data files to rule out transfer errors. Correspondence
checks of all measures were conducted for 10% of the included constituencies (rounded
to the nearest whole number). The Excel® function “=RANDOMBETWEEN()” was
used to generate a list of random constituencies for correspondence checks. Then, the
data from the randomly selected constituencies were compared to the data sources. If any
data did not match, the data was corrected and the entire correspondence check was
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restarted. This procedure repeated until a sample with 100% correspondence was
obtained.
Correspondence checks between the data file and the graphical displays not
necessary given that the graphing process was automated by R Studio®.
IOA procedure. IOA for this analysis was crowd sourced from the Teaching
Behavior Analysis email listserv. Any reader of the listserv could submit their
observations of the data through a Google® Form so long as they held BCBA or BCBAD certification (as verified by their BACB number provided during form submission) and
indicated that they had experience using scatterplots to evaluate functional relations
between variables. The scatterplots revealed relations or lack there-of so clearly that this
analysis depended solely on the judgments of these second observers without training.
Participating observers evaluated each scatterplot on their own computer. The
same scatterplots generated for each national election were displayed within the Google®
Form one at a time, except without labels indicating variables or the phenomenon of
interest. One question was listed below each graph: “What is the relationship between the
variables?” Seven answers will be displayed beneath each question: (a) “the graph
indicates that there is a strong positive relation among the variables”, (b) “the graph
indicates that there is a moderate positive relation among the variables”, (c) “the graph
indicates that there is a weak positive relation among the variables”, (d) “the graph
indicates that there is a strong negative relation among the variables”, (e) “the graph
indicates that there is a moderate negative relation among the variables”, (f) “the graph
indicates that there is a weak negative relation among the variables”, (h) “the graph
indicates that there is no relation among the variables”. Observers could only select one
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answer per question. IOA was calculated using an exact IOA calculation, which divided
the number of graphs with complete agreement among all observers by the total number
of graphs.
Results and Discussion
Six nations met the inclusionary criterion for this analysis. One nation was further
excluded following correspondence checks due to data inconsistencies from month-tomonth observations of the nation’s government statistical website. Table 11 displays five
nations that remained in this analysis. Data were obtained online from each nation’s
respective statistical agency or electoral commission (Australian Electoral Commission,
n.d.-b; Elections Canada, n.d.; Electoral Commission, n.d.; Electoral Commission of
Jamaica, n.d.; The Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, n.d.). Appendix F
contains the scatterplot graphs that were prepared for the visual analyses. Table 11 also
displays the outliers removed from each nation, the visual analyses, and the results of the
crowd-sourced IOA. No responses were received from the crowd-sourced IOA for this
analysis. Without IOA, it is unclear if the following observations hold true across
observers.
Figure 12 displays the strip-line plot of the ratio of registered voters to polling
stations within each constituency in the three most-recent elections within included
nations. Figures 13 through 27 display each election observed within each included
nation. Correspondence checks revealed the data inconsistencies in the excluded nation
noted above, and as well as two errors in the Canadian data and inconsistencies within
one Australian election that was due to ajar pasting. In total, correspondence checks were

32
conducted five times before a sample met criterion. The visual analysis revealed no
relation in any observed election.
One limitation revealed by correspondence checks were data inconsistencies of
publicly available data in one originally included, later excluded, nation. This irregularity
suggests that readers should interpret these data with skepticism. All analyses did not
control for data smudging—that is, differences between actual and reported voter turnout.
In all cases, it was seemingly impossible to account for data smudging. Smudging could
even occur before data were made publicly available, which brings the validity of all data
into question. This appears to be a problem worth addressing in future behavior analytic
research that uses publicly available data. Similar to analysis 1, this analysis could not
control for all variables that may have contributed to the observed voter turnout. It would
not be a surprise if future analyses reveal variables that compromise the following
conclusions. For example, it is not known if voter suppression tactics—such as
misinformation presented by automated robot calls (Bronskill, 2015)—were in effect
during any given election. Future research might aim to identify tactics to better control
extraneous variables, although this may be an ever-present shortcoming of naturalistic,
group-level analyses.
Barring future evidence of the above, the results of this analysis indicates that the
density of registered voters to polling stations had no effect on turnout within nations.
The nature of the scatterplot design enabled the detection of a relation by analyzing
constituencies as clusters and evaluating patterns in how density and turnout vary
together. If there was a relation, then the condensed scatterplot would reveal a “cooling”
or “heating” trend as the density increases or decreases. As with analysis 1, this analysis
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garners strength in consideration of the experimental rigor of single-case design.
Repeated measures of polling stations across elections both within and across nations
demonstrate that there is no effect. Further, the results of the regression analysis matched
this visual analysis.
The aim of this analysis was to assess the effect of response effort on voting due
to crowding in or at polling stations, or distance to polling stations. The results indicate
that response effort due to crowding has no effect on turnout. However, it could be the
case that these included nations address crowding by carefully planning the number of
polling stations with consideration of the number of voters within each constituency. If
this is the case, then this analysis is compromised because government controls prevent
an analysis of turnout when polling stations are added and removed. Future directions for
polling station analyses are outlined in the general discussion.
Analysis 3: Duration of Party Control on Popular Vote
Method
Subjects. Groups of voters within democratic nations served as the subjects for
analysis. Voters from nations in analysis 1 were eligible for inclusion in this analysis only
if each national election from 1945 to present observed two political parties consistently
receive at least 70% of the popular vote combined. If the nation did not host presidential
elections, then parliamentary elections were evaluated to determine inclusion. If the
nation hosted run-off polls (i.e., any system that re-distributes or re-polls citizens to force
a two-party race), the first ballots casted in each election were evaluated for inclusion.
Dependent measures. Popular vote was defined as the number of votes for a
party divided by the total number of casted votes in the election. If the nation hosted run-
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off polls, only the first ballots casted in each election were evaluated. Other parties were
noted only if their popular vote in an election exceeded 10%.
Design. Popular vote was evaluated using (i) a single-case apparatus known as the
repeating A-B design and (ii) statistical t-tests. With the repeating A-B design, conditions
were defined by which of the two parties held power of the nation’s government. Then
the percentage of popular vote for each of the two parties was graphed for each election
observed. One party was coded with circles as data points, the other with diamonds as
data points. The party in power was indicated with filled data points.
Procedure.
Data collection and interpretation. Popular vote data for each election was
gathered from published encyclopediae and from each nation’s electoral statistics agency
or electoral commission. Data for each nation were graphed separately. Table 12 displays
the definitions of different trends and variables used to define the data. Elections with a
third party conflict and conditions with only one election were removed from the graphs
for the visual analysis. Then, each graph was visually inspected for the trend of popular
vote among four circumstances, (i) trend of Party X’s popular vote given Party X in
power, (ii) trend of Party X’s popular vote given Party Y in power, (iii) trend of Party Y’s
popular vote given Party Y in power, and (iv) trend of Party Y’s popular vote given Party
X in power. Finally, summative data of the trends were compiled.
Integrity of the graphical displays. Correspondence checks were conducted
between the data sources and data files to rule out transfer errors. 33% of the included
elections were checked (rounded up) using the procedures described in analysis 2.
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IOA procedure. Similar to analysis 2, IOA for this analysis was crowd sourced
from the Teaching Behavior Analysis email listserv. Any reader of the listserv could
submit their observations of the data through a Google® Form so long as they held
BCBA or BCBA-D certification (as verified by their BACB number provided during
form submission) and indicated that they have experience using repeated A-B designs to
evaluate functional relations between variables. These observers were not trained by the
primary author because we believe that the graphs will reveal relations or lack there-of so
clearly that we will rely solely on the judgments of these second observers for IOA.
Participating observers evaluated each national graph on their own computer. The
same national graphs generated for each national election were displayed within the
Google® Form one at a time, except without labels indicating variables or the
phenomenon of interest. Four questions were listed below each graph: (i) “What is the
trend of the circles when they are filled?” (ii) “What is the trend of the circles when they
are not filled?” (iii) “What is the trend of the diamonds when they are filled?” and (iv)
“What is the trend of diamonds when they are not filled?” Three answers will be
displayed beside each question: (a) “ascending,” (b) “descending,” or (c) “no-trend.”
Observers could only select one answer per question. IOA was calculated using an exact
IOA calculation, which will divide the number questions about a specific graph with
complete agreement among all observers by the total number of questions asked.
Results and Discussion
Barbados, Jamaica, Liechtenstein, and the United States of America were
included in this analysis. Data were obtained from tables in published encyclopediae and
each nation’s respective statistical agency or electoral commission (The Barbados
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Electoral and Boundaries Commission, n.d.; Electoral Commission of Jamaica, n.d.;
Hillebrands, & Falk, 2005; Landtagswahlen, n.d.; Linder, & Schultze, 2005; Marxer,
2010; National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.; Wüst, 2005). Appendix G
contains the popular vote graphs that were prepared for the visual analyses. Table 13
displays the visual analyses and the results of the crowd-sourced IOA. Three responses
were received from the crowd-sourced IOA for this analysis. The obtained IOA was
81.25%. Three total disagreements occurred. One disagreement appears to be an error (as
the displayed trends are clearly descending) while the other two disagreements occurred
with trends that could be argued to be either a no-trend or descending. The subjectivity of
visual analysis is a recurring theme that will be addressed in the general discussion.
Figure 28 displays the popular vote of the included nations. Figures 29-32 display
popular vote within each included nation. Correspondence checks of the data revealed no
transfer errors. The visual analysis reveals that parties in power always observe a
descending trend in popular vote, and that parties not holding power usually observe an
ascending trend in popular vote (in 75% of cases).
The limitations of this analysis mirror those found in the former two analyses,
namely lack of control over the variables, the possibility of extraneous variables, and
questionable data accuracy. However, of all three analyses, this repeated A-B design
most clearly demonstrates the presence of a functional relation. The rapid reversal of
conditions demonstrates a clear and reliable influence of a parties’ duration of
government control on popular vote. Further, this effect is observed across all included
nations. The reliability of this effect is evident. This consideration and related implication
require greater discussion in the context of the findings of all three analyses.
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General Discussion
These three analyses demonstrate the potential of using single-case design to
evaluate group behavior. One apparent shortcoming of single-case design concerns IOA.
In analysis 1, strict definitions for variability and trend were necessary to bring about
agreement with other interpreters. In analysis 3, definitions of trend were not provided to
observers for IOA, which may account for why observers sometimes disagreed. The
definitions used in analysis 1 were generated after informal visual analyses, which means
that they are somewhat arbitrary and subject to bias. Future research could improve the
definitions used in analysis 1 by investigating what best constitutes variability, level, and
trend using mathematical reasoning. For example, segmented regressions could be used
to identify changes in trend. Further, it may be the case that variability and level are
relative to the phenomenon under study. A method that generates definitions of
variability, level, and trend that appropriately fit different phenomenon may be of use for
future research.
Despite this shortcoming, single-case design captured the idiosyncratic nature of
group phenomenon—different nations enjoyed similar turnouts under different
circumstances. For example, nations with and without compulsory laws might see high
voter turnout. This suggests that the influences for one group are different for another, or
that influences unaccounted for in this study were similar between nations (e.g.,
motivating operations related to “national pride”).
A comparison of nations showed that compulsory voting laws do not increase the
estimated eligible voter turnout; however, compulsory voting does appear to increase
registered voter turnout. It is possible that the delivery of fines to absent registered voters
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established elections as a reflexive conditioned motivating operation (CMO-R;
Langthorne & McGill, 2009). If this is the case, then voting is evoked because it
functions as a negative reinforcer (in that, the citizen avoids the opportunity to receive a
fine). Those eligible to vote may not register as a means to avoid punishment for
remaining away from the polls. That aside, there could be an effect that was not detected
due to the differing potencies of punishment used between the included nations. For
example, Belgian voters who remain away from the polls could temporarily lose of the
right to vote; yet, the same level of voter turnout is observed under Australia’s AUD$20
fine. In comparison, Paraguay’s small fine appears to have no effect, and Mexico’s
compulsory voting law is an example that threat alone may not have an effect. Future
analyses might seek to study this phenomenon and determine if there is a correlation
between the potency/aversive-quality of the punishment for remaining away from the
polling station.
That being said, our efforts in improving voter turnout might best be used in the
pursuit of non-punishment-based interventions. Punishment is correlated with a variety of
well documented side effects (see Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007, for a review).
Nations that implement compulsory voting could observe common side effects on a large
scale, which could take the form of protests, citizen violence, passive resistance to the
laws (such as eligible voters choosing to remain unregistered), or emigration. Given a
possibility of observing these side-effects with compulsory voting, it stands to reason that
compulsory voting would undermine the primary function of elections (i.e., peaceful
citizen counter-control of government control). Nations that are considering the
implementation of compulsory voting must take care and scrutinize compulsory voting.
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Compulsory voting appears counter-intuitive and would only produce an environment
where citizens have to vote; indeed, a better goal for researchers is to reveal tactics that
influence citizens so that they want to vote (Lang & Witts, 2016).
One variable that might affect a citizen’s drive to vote is response effort. Analysis
2 sought to evaluate response effort by measuring the density of registered voters to
polling stations against voter turnout within constituencies. One hypothesis was that
higher density could produce longer lines, which might influence voters to remain away
from the polls. The current findings suggest that there is no relation. One explanation for
this outcome might be due to a mismatch between the research question and the level of
the analysis. Here, it may be the case that this between-group analysis—that is, the
analysis of turnout across constituencies and nations—does not adequately capture the
effects of polling station density on voters. Future research may better address this
question by conducting a within-group analysis of registered voter to polling station
density. Another option is to turn to the individual level of analysis. Future research
might attempt to capture voting when the polling stations vary in distance from election
to election. Both levels should be evaluated before research forms a conclusion.
Likewise, researchers interested in increasing voter turnout may find withingroup/procedural and/or system analyses helpful in identifying tactics that bring about
higher levels of voter turnout. For example, a visual analysis of Figures 1 and 2 invites an
investigation of variables that maintain high voter turnout in nations without compulsory
voting, such as Iceland and Denmark. Within-group analyses could isolate the variables
at play. Granted, control is again an issue; governments may be reluctant to experiment
with policies on a national level. Further, what works for one nation might not work for
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another. Alternatively, researchers should plan to conduct small-scale, local government
research. Small-scale research is a standard first-step in analyses of organizational
behavior (Austin, 2000), and has been recommended for a first step in changing
organizations who impact climate change (Biglan, 2016). With regards to voting, smallscale research could test many different tactics concurrently across a number of local
governments. It stands to reason that this approach would more quickly reveal the
tactic(s) that bring about higher levels of voter turnout, and would bring that nation one
step closer to adopting a policy to implement at the national level.
Two avenues for future small-scale research include systematic prompting and
reinforcement procedures (Lang & Witts, 2016). Systematic prompting—that is, vocal or
textual prompts that are arranged to occur in some sort of specific, recurring fashion—has
been shown to be effective in changing behaviors with observable community outcomes,
such as recycling, littering, and energy consumption (see Luyben, 2009, for a review).
Using reinforcement to increase voting may be another option; although cost is a likely
concern. One option might be to provide voters with a voucher to redeem a tax credit
(Hicks, 2002). Another option might be to establish elections as a meta-contingency.
Elections are not technically a meta-contingency because only one citizen is necessary to
vote to produce a winner in a representative government. Elections, therefore, could be
altered so that the result is contingent upon a threshold of aggregated responding.
However, electoral quorums could bring about side-effects associated with extinction. It
is possible that a separate meta-contingency could run parallel to election; for example,
maybe X number of votes are required before Y percentage of voters are randomly
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provided with a tax credit. These and other ideas appear to be reasonable methods for
increasing voter turnout. What is needed next is small-scale testing.
Small-scale testing could also enable researchers to go beyond the analysis of
density or the number of polling stations. A thorough, process-level analysis may be
useful in identifying the aspects of the polling stations and the voting process that have
the greatest effect on voters. A functional assessment tool might be needed to detect
features of the environment that affect voter turnout. It is possible that future research
could adapt the Performance Diagnostic Checklist (Austin, 2000) for polling station
processes. If troubleshooting is required, a process assessment would streamline
investigations. If useful, these checklists could interest governments and/or regulating
agencies that seek to optimize polling stations to promote voting.
At the systems-level, one immediately clear way to promote voting is to
implement or carry-on with any election system other than those that force, enable, or
encourage two-party races. Analysis 3 reveals that parties who hold power evoke more
and more votes towards the opposing party with each passing election. It is possible that
government activity functions as a motivating operation for change, and therefore a
government change is to be expected. The problem is that two-party systems consistently
evoke votes towards the party not in power. This kind of predictability is likely to
account for the lack of third-party competition; in other words, the system itself is a
motivating operation that does little to bring about value in voting for third parties. This
kind of predictability undermines a citizen’s ability to bring about the kind of change that
they truly value; rather, they must compromise by voting for the only other alternative.
Future research should investigate whether other systems establish similar effects. One
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option might be to conduct replicated A-B designs that capture a governing party’s
popular vote relative to the popular vote of all other parties. There may be systems that
allow for citizens to assume more control over the composition of government and thus
avoid undue influence on how citizens vote.
Two hurdles facing future group-level analyses are access to and management of
data. Missing data was the most common reason for excluding a nation from the second
analysis. Some nations do offer data sets for purchase; however, open data (i.e., publicly
available data online) would be one less barrier for replication. Nations and researchers
need to work together to identify and publish the relevant data for public access. These
efforts would establish electoral accountability and transparency, and could bring
researchers closer to positions to influence government to resolve low voter turnout.
When researchers are in a position to solve problems, they will need to be familiar with
technology that will more quickly produce graphical representations. For example,
consider that Figure 12 summarized over 8000 individual measures. Microsoft Excel®
was at best suited for data gathering and preparation. In these analyses, the user interface
for Microsoft Excel® was ill-fit when attempting to produce the graphs specified by the
procedures; further, complex graphical adjustments and scrolling through the data were
frequently met with crashing. R program coding solved these problems and completed
graphing much more quickly. It is also likely that future researcher’s may wish to gather
geographical data about voting, in which case, knowledge of geographic information
systems (GIS) will be necessary. Researchers interested in these topics must seek training
in these alternative technologies, or at the very least, collaborate with someone with the
requisite skills.
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There are many more implications that can be drawn from these present findings
and discussion. Foremost, behavior analysts can and should being working with
aggregated responding within groups. These analyses offer some validity for one
phenomenon, but there are likely many others where single-case design is suitable. The
behavior analytic field is tasked to change the world for the better (Houmanfar &
Mattaini, 2016; Malott et al., 1995), and it is possible we can do more by treating the
aggregated responding of a group as the single-case. Other fields readily conduct
analyses at the group level—surely there are collaborations to be struck. Future research
should conduct analyses at both the within- and between-group levels of analysis.
Regarding voting, there likely are other variables that influence voter turnout. The first
step is descriptive research at every level of analysis. Given the idiosyncratic nature of
each nation’s electoral environment, within-group analyses might best demonstrate what
works for a group. To that end, nations looking for to change their electoral system
should aim to conduct small-scale, local government research (Lang & Witts, 2016). It is
an avenue that will identify what works and what does not work more quickly than
guesswork alone. Haphazard / non-systematic approaches that lack evidence simply
misuse public funds; like using a slot machine, the policy makers—and citizens—could
net a loss. Small-scale, local government research will produce tactics that work on a
large-scale level. Public policy should—at all times—be an experiment (Campbell, 1969;
Fawcett, Bernstein, et al., 1988). Experimentation, in turn, brings about policy that is
error-free. That said, readers are cautioned against holding these results as truths; instead,
readers are urged to evaluate these and other tactics on a small-scale, local government
level. Moving forward with an experimental lens will more quickly discover tactics that
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will bring about a high voting turnout for a nation. These types of investigations help
ensure that citizens in democratic nations continue to enjoy a system that provides a nonviolent means of influencing government that, in turn, influences us all.
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Tables
Table 1
Original definitions of variability, level, and trend for analysis 1

Item
Stable variability

Variable variability
High level
Low level
Ascending trend
Descending trend
No-trend
Outlier

Definition
Data paths show little deviation from the overall trend
direction as indicated by a relatively small degree of
change in data path slopes.
Data paths show large deviation from the overall trend
direction as indicated by the relatively large degree of
change in data path slopes.
The last three data paths trend at or above 80%.
One or more of the last three data paths trend below
80%.
Data paths trend away form the abscissa), “descending
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa.
Data paths trend away form the abscissa), “descending
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa.
The data paths trend neither towards or away from the
abscissa.
Any data point that deviates 40% or more from the data
points that it follows and proceeds.
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Table 2
List of nations included in the analysis of compulsory voting on voter turnout trends
Nation

Sanctions?

Antigua and Barbuda

Compulsory
Voting?
No

Australia

Yes

Austria

No

AUD$20 fine with subsequent charges
for repeat offenders (Australian
Electoral Commission, n.d.-a)
N/A

Barbados

No

N/A

Belgium

Yes

Brazil

Yes

Canada

No

EUR$30-60 fines for first time nonvoters, EUR$60-150 fines for repeat
non-voters, removal of right to vote
for ten years if a voter has not voted in
the last 15 years (Belgium’s Ministry
of the Interior, n.d.)
Appointed court date and judge
determines amount of fine (Brazil’s
Superior Electoral Court, n.d.).
N/A

Colombia

No

N/A

Costa Rica

Yes

Denmark

No

None (International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
n.d.-a)
N/A

Dominica

No

N/A

El Salvador

No

N/A

Finland

No

N/A

France

No

N/A

Germany

No

N/A

N/A
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Grenada

No

N/A

Guatemala

Unknown

Honduras

Abolished
following 1985
election
Yes

Iceland

No

None (International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
n.d.-a)
N/A

India

No

N/A

Ireland

No

N/A

Israel

No

N/A

Italy

Public posting of names of non-voters
at town halls (Jackman, 1987)

Jamaica

Abolished
following 1992
election
No

Japan

No

N/A

Liechtenstein

Yes

Luxembourg

Yes

Malta

No

SFR$20 fine (Liechtenstein
Parliamentary Elections, n.d.)
Fines and increased fines for repeat
non-voters (Luxembourg Legislative
Elections, n.d.)
N/A

Mexico

Yes

Netherlands

New Zealand

Abolished
following 1971
election
No

Norway

No

N/A

Paraguay

Yes

Poland

No

USD$7-14 (ABC Color as cited in
Duffy & Matros, 2014)
N/A

N/A

In practice there are no sanctions
enforced (Bódeva, 2013)
~USD$30; however in practice fines
were rarely issued (Irwin, 1974)
N/A
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Saint Kitts and Nevis

No

N/A

Saint Lucia

No

N/A

Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Sweden

No

N/A

No

N/A

Switzerland

Fines between USD$1-8 (Bódeva,
2013) but there were difficulties with
enforcement (Birch, 2009)

Trinidad and Tobago

Abolished in all but
one canton
following 1971
election
No

United Kingdom

No

N/A

United States of
America

No

N/A

N/A
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Table 3
Summary of the IOA training results for analysis 1
Round 1

Round 2

Observer

Training
T2C

Test
Score

Training
T2C

Test
Score

1

27

2/4

19

0/2

2

29

4/6

18

1/3

3

X (14/23)

-

-

-

20

9/10*

-

-

Note: “T2C” means, “trials to criterion”; * means the test score meets the criterion to proceed with IOA; X
means that the training was terminated to update the definitions of variability and trend.
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Table 4
Updated definitions of variability, level, and trend for analysis 1

Item

Definition

Stable variability

One or fewer data points fully cross the constraint lines.

Variable variability

Two or more data points fully cross the constraint lines.

High level

The last three data paths trend at or above 80%.

Low level

One or more of the last three data paths trend below
80%.

Ascending trend

The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is above 0.1.

Descending trend

The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is below -0.1.

No-trend
Outlier

The slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is between 0.1
and -0.1.
Any data point that deviates 40% or more from the data
points that it follows and proceeds.
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Table 5
Comparison of visual analyses between observers
Nations

Antigua and Barbuda

Australia

Austria

Barbados

Belgium

Brazil

Canada

Colombia

Costa Rica

Visual Analysis
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable notrend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.

Second Observer’s Visual
Analysis
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable notrend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
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Denmark

Dominica

El Salvador

Finland

France

Germany

Grenada

Guatemala

EEV: A high stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A high stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: An initially low
stable descending trend
followed by a low variable
ascending trend;
REG: An initially low
variable ascending trend
followed by a low variable
no-trend.
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend (with
CV); a low variable
ascending trend (without
CV);
REG: A low variable
descending trend (with
CV); a low variable
ascending trend (without
CV).

EEV: A high stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
EEV: A high stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: An initially low
stable descending trend
followed by a low variable
ascending trend;
REG: An initially low
variable ascending trend
followed by a low variable
no-trend.
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend (with CV);
a low variable ascending
trend (without CV);
REG: A low variable
descending trend (with
CV); a low variable
ascending trend (without
CV).

Honduras

Iceland

India

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Jamaica

Japan

Liechtenstein

Luxembourg

EEV: A low variable notrend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend.;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV);
REG: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
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EEV: A low variable notrend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable notrend;
REG: A low stable notrend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend.;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV);
REG: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable notrend.
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Malta

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Paraguay

Poland

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines

EEV: A high stable notrend.;
REG: A high stable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low variable notrend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable
ascending trend (with CV);
a low stable descending
trend (without CV);
REG: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.

EEV: A high stable notrend.;
REG: A high stable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low variable notrend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable
ascending trend (with CV);
a low stable descending
trend (without CV);
REG: A high stable notrend (with CV); a low
stable descending trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A low variable
ascending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.
EEV: A high stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
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Sweden

Switzerland

Trinidad and Tobago

United Kingdom

United States of America

EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend (with
CV); a low stable no-trend
(without CV);
REG: A low stable
descending trend (with
CV); a low stable no-trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.

EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A high stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend (with
CV); a low stable no-trend
(without CV);
REG: A low stable
descending trend (with
CV); a low stable no-trend
(without CV).
EEV: A low stable
ascending trend;
REG: A low stable
ascending trend.
EEV: A low stable
descending trend;
REG: A low stable
descending trend.
EEV: A low variable
descending trend;
REG: A low variable
descending trend.

Note: “EEV” means estimated eligible voter turnout, “REG” means registered voter turnout, “CV” means
compulsory voting.
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Table 6
IOA reference table for “Variability”
Primary Author Analysis
Second Observer Analysis

Stable

Variable

Stable

69

0

Variable

0

23

Note: Underlined numerals are instances of agreement.
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Table 7
IOA reference table for “Level”
Primary Author Analysis
Second Observer Analysis

High

Low

High

17

1

Low

0

74

Note: Underlined numerals are instances of agreement.
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Table 8
IOA reference table for “Trend”
Primary Author Analysis
Second Observer Analysis

No-Trend

Ascending

Descending

No-Trend

22

0

0

Ascending

0

14

1

Descending

0

0

55

Note: Underlined numerals are instances of agreement.
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Table 9
Summary of visual analysis across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout

Group

Count

High level

High and
descending

Low level

Low, and
descending or
no-trend

Estimated eligible voter turnout
All

42

7 (17%)

2 (29%)

35 (83%)

28 (80%)

CV

9

1 (11%)

0 (0%)

8 (89%)

7 (88%)

33 (4
abolished)

6 (18%)

2 (33%)

27 (82%)

21 (78%)

No CV

Registered voter turnout
All

42

7 (17%)

2 (29%)

35 (83%)

33 (95%)

CV

9

3 (33%)

0 (0%)

6 (66%)

6 (100%)

33 (4
abolished)

4 (12%)

2 (50%)

29 (88%)

27 (93%)

No CV
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Table 10
Summary of statistical analysis across estimated eligible and registered voter turnout

Variable

df

t

p

322.137

-1.590

0.113

Excluding nations that have abolished CV

723

-2.033

0.042

Within nations that have abolished CV

74

0.823

0.413

777

6.675

0.001*

Excluding nations that have abolished CV

701

6.673

0.001*

Within nations that have abolished CV

74

2.625

0.011

Estimated eligible voter turnout
Between elections with and w/o CV

Registered voter turnout
Between elections with and w/o CV

Note: * means significance with an alpha equal to 0.001.
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Table 11
Included nations, outliers, visual analyses, and IOA for analysis 2
Election

Outliers Removed

Visual Analysis

IOA

Australia
2007

6

No relation

NVAL

2010

6

No relation

NVAL

2013

7

No relation

NVAL

Canada
2008

28

No relation

NVAL

2011

27

No relation

NVAL

2015

30

No relation

NVAL

Jamaica
2007

3

No relation

NVAL

2011

4

No relation

NVAL

2016

3

No relation

NVAL

Luxembourg
2004

13

No relation

NVAL

2009

15

No relation

NVAL

2013

8

No relation

NVAL

New Zealand
2008

7

No relation

NVAL

2011

7

No relation

NVAL

2014

7

No relation

NVAL

Note: “NVAL” means data were not available for analysis.
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Table 12
Definitions of different trends and variables for analysis 3

Item
Condition
Ascending trend
Descending trend
No-trend
Third party conflict

Definition
A period where one political party controlled the
majority of seats in a government legislature or
congress.
Data paths trend away from the abscissa), “descending
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa.
Data paths trend away from the abscissa), “descending
trend” (i.e., data paths trend toward the abscissa.
The data paths trend neither towards nor away from the
abscissa.
An election where a third party observed 15% or more of
the popular vote.
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Table 13
Included nations, visual analyses, and IOA for analysis 3
Condition

Visual Analysis

IOA

Barbados
BLP in power

Descending

3/3

BLP not in power

Ascending

3/3

DLP in power

Descending

3/3

DLP not in power

Ascending

3/3

Jamaica
JLP in power

Descending

2/3

JLP not in power

Ascending

3/3

PNP in power

Descending

3/3

PNP not in power

Ascending

3/3

Liechtenstein
PC in power

Descending

3/3

PC not in power

Descending

2/3

PU in power

Descending

3/3

PU not in power

No-trend

3/3

USA
Democrats in power

Descending

2/3

Democrats not in power

Ascending

3/3

Republicans in power

Descending

3/3

Republicans not in power

Ascending

3/3
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Figures

Figure 1. A condensed line graph displaying the level of estimated eligible voter turnout
across elections for each nation analyzed. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; thin data paths
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indicate that the data path trended below 80%; thick data paths indicate that the data path
trended entirely above 80%. Nations were arranged according to their use of CV and in
order according to percentage of total trends above 80%. If tied, nations were listed
alphabetically.
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Figure 2. A condensed line graph displaying the level of registered voter turnout across
elections for each nation analyzed. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; thin data paths
indicate that the data path trended below 80%; thick data paths indicate that the data path
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trended entirely above 80%. Nations were arranged according to their use of CV and in
order according to percentage of total trends above 80%. If tied, nations were listed
alphabetically.
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Figure 3. A multiple-baseline graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered voter
turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the horizontal
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted line
indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 4. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 5. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 6. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 7. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 8. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 9. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and registered
voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held without
compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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Figure 10. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and
registered voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held
without compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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Figure 11. A constant series control graph displaying the estimated eligible and
registered voter turnout across included elections. Open circles represent elections held
without compulsory voting (CV); open triangles represent elections held with CV; the
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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Figure 12. A strip-line plot displaying the ratio of registered voters to polling stations
within each constituency in the three most-recent elections within included nations. The
turnout within each constituency is colour-coded according to the heat map.
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Figure 13. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2007 Australian
federal elections.
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Figure 14. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2010 Australian
federal elections.
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Figure 15. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2013 Australian
federal elections.
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Figure 16. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2008 Canadian
federal elections.
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Figure 17. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 Canadian
federal elections.
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Figure 18. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2015 Canadian
federal elections.
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Figure 19. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2007 Jamaican
general elections.
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Figure 20. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 Jamaican
general elections.
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Figure 21. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2016 Jamaican
general elections.
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Figure 22. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2004 Luxembourg
general elections.
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Figure 23. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2009 Luxembourg
general elections.
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Figure 24. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2013 Luxembourg
general elections.
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Figure 25. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2005 New Zealand
general elections.
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Figure 26. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 New Zealand
general elections.
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Figure 27. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio of
registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2014 New Zealand
general elections.
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Figure 28. A repeated A-B graph displaying alternating conditions of party control and
its effect on popular vote within two-party nations included in analysis 3. For Barbados,
circles represent the Barbados Labour Party and diamonds represent the Democratic
Labour Party; for Jamaica, circles represent the Jamaica Labour Party and diamonds
represent the People's National Party; for Liechtenstein, circles represent Progressive
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Citizens’ Party and diamonds represent the Patriotic Union; for the United States of
America, circles represent the Democratic Party and diamonds represent the Republican
Party. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government.
Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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Figure 29. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Barbados Labour
Party (circles) and Democratic Labour Party (diamonds) across Barbadian general
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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Figure 30. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Jamaica Labour Party
(circles) and People's National Party (diamonds) across Jamaican general elections. Filled
data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase lines
represent a change in power from one party to the other.

97

Figure 31. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Progressive Citizens’
Party (circles) and Patriotic Union (diamonds) across Liechtenstein general elections.
Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase
lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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Figure 32. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Democratic Party
(circles) and Republican Party (diamonds) across presidential elections in the United
States of America. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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Appendix A: IOA Training Materials
IOA Rubric
(1) Determine the trend. No-trend: the data paths trend neither towards or away
from the abscissa. Ascending trend: data paths trend away from the abscissa. Descending
trend: data paths trend toward the abscissa. Changing trend: data paths initially trend in
one direction and then begin to trend in a different direction (i.e., initially trend X
followed by trend Y). When in doubt, do a pencil test to determine if there is a direction
to the trend.
For example: (i) “Initially ascending trend followed by no-trend”, (ii) “Initially
no-trend followed by descending trend”, (iii) “Initially descending trend followed by
ascending trend”.
(2) Determine the variability (if changing trend, indicate for both trends).
Stable: data paths show little deviation from the overall trend direction as indicated by a
relatively small degree of change in data path slopes. Variable: data paths show large
deviation from the overall trend direction as indicated by the relatively large degree of
change in data path slopes.
(3) Determine the level (if changing trend, indicate for both trends). High: the
last three data paths trend at or above 80%. Low: one or more of the last three data paths
trend below 80%. Note: a continuously ascending or descending trend may be attributed
as a high to low or low to high trend.
(4) Write the findings. For example: (i) “A low stable ascending trend”, (ii) “A
high variable no-trend”, (iii) “An initially low stable no-trend followed by a high variable
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ascending trend ”, (iv) “An initially high variable descending trend followed by a low
stable no-trend”
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Practice Graphs

Practice Graph 1. A low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 2. An initially high stable no-trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 3. A low variable ascending trend.

Practice Graph 4. An initially low stable descending trend followed by a low variable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 5. A high stable no-trend.

Practice Graph 6. An initially low variable descending trend followed by a low stable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 7. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high stable notrend.

Practice Graph 8. A low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 9. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low variable
descending.

Practice Graph 10. A low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 11. A low stable no-trend.

Practice Graph 12. A high variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 13. A high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 14. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable notrend.
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Practice Graph 15. A low variable descending trend.

Practice Graph 16. A high stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 17. An initially high stable descending trend followed by a low stable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 18. An initially low stable no-trend followed by a high variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 19. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 20. An initially low variable no-trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 21. An initially low stable no-trend followed by a low stable ascending
trend.
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Practice Graph 22. An initially low stable descending trend followed by a low stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 23. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high variable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 24. An initially low variable ascending trend followed by a high stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 25. An initially high stable descending trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 26. An initially low variable ascending trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 27. An initially low variable descending trend followed by a low stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 28. An initially low variable no-trend followed by a high variable notrend.
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Practice Graph 29. An initially low variable no-trend followed by a low stable ascending
trend.
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Practice Graph 30. An initially low variable ascending trend followed by a high stable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 31. An initially high variable no-trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 32. An initially low variable descending trend followed by a low variable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 33. An initially high stable descending trend followed by a low variable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 34. An initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 35. An initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending
trend.
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Practice Graph 36. An initially low stable no-trend followed by a low variable ascending
trend.
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Practice Graph 37. An initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high stable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 38. An initially low variable ascending trend followed by a high variable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 39. An initially high variable no-trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 40. An initially low variable ascending trend followed by a high variable
ascending trend.
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Appendix B: Analysis 1 Visual Analysis (V1VA) Graphs

A1VA Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and Barbuda.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and
Barduda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.

150

A1VA Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El Salvador.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala. The
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted
line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.

189

A1VA Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy. The horizontal
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical dotted line
indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.

193

A1VA Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy. The
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Liechtenstein.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Luxembourg.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The dotted line
indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands. The
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the
Netherlands. The horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or
path; the vertical dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New Zealand.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and Nevis.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts
and Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Lucia.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
X’s indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election with
missing data.
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A1VA Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an election
with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland. The
horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the vertical
dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland.
The horizontal dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the
vertical dotted line indicates when compulsory voting laws were abolished; X’s indicate
an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and Tobago.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad and
Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United Kingdom.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s indicate an
election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.
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A1VA Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of
America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; X’s
indicate an election with missing data.

231

A1VA Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
States of America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
X’s indicate an election with missing data.
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Appendix C: Updated IOA Practice Graphs

Practice Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as an initially low variable descending trend followed by a low variable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable no-trend followed by a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable ascending trend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low variable descending trend.

239

Practice Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a high stable no-trend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable no-trend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable no-tend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a low variable descending
trend.
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Practice Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low variable descending
trend.
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Practice Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable descending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El
Salvador. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained
to label this graph as an initially low variable descending trend followed by a low stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a high stable no-trend.

259

Practice Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low variable descending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first
condition as a low variable descending trend. Observers were trained to label the second
condition as a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the
first condition as a low variable descending trend. Observers were trained to label the
second condition as a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a low stable descending
trend.
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Practice Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first
condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the second
condition as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first
condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the second
condition as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable no-trend followed by a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable ascending trend followed by a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Liechtenstein. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as an initially low stable no-trend followed by a low stable
ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Luxembourg. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low
variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the
first condition as a high stable ascending trend. Observers were trained to label the
second condition as a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the
Netherlands. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label the first condition as a low stable ascending trend. Observers were trained
to label the second condition as a high stable descending.
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Practice Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New
Zealand. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as a high stable no-trend followed by a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a high stable no-trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable descending
trend.
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Practice Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
a low stable no-trend followed by a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and
Nevis. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as a low variable no-trend.

301

Practice Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts
and Nevis. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained
to label this graph as an initially low variable descending trend followed by a low stable
no-trend.
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Practice Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint
Lucia. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as an initially low variable no-trend followed by a low variable
descending trend.
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Practice Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph as a low stable descending trend followed by a
low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The data
were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this graph as
an initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden.
The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph as an initially high stable no-trend followed by a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland. The
data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label the first
condition as a low stable no-trend. Observers were trained to label the second condition
as a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Switzerland. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label the first condition as a low stable no-trend. Observers were trained to
label the second condition as a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and
Tobago. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph as an initially low stable descending trend followed by a low variable notrend.
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Practice Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad
and Tobago. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as an initially low stable descending trend followed by a low
variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained
to label this graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable notrend.
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Practice Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained
to label this graph as an initially low stable ascending trend followed by a low stable notrend.
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Practice Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of
America. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained
to label this graph as a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
States of America. The data were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as an initially low variable no-trend trend followed by a low
variable descending trend.
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Appendix D: Analysis 1 Visual Analysis (V1VA) Graphs Version 2

A1VA-2 Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.

320

A1VA-2 Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El Salvador.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala under
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala without
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.

352

A1VA-2 Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.

356

A1VA-2 Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.

360

A1VA-2 Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy under
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy under
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 50. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Liechtenstein. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates
the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Luxembourg. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates
the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 64. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the
Netherlands under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high”
data point or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along
the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.

380

A1VA-2 Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the Netherlands
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 66. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the
Netherlands without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a
“high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number
along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New
Zealand. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and
Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts
and Nevis. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The
dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate
the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the lineof-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Lucia.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates
the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The dotted
line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines indicate the
criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of the line-ofbest-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden.
The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey lines
indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the slope of
the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland under
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland
under compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or
path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 85. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland without
compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 86. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland
without compulsory voting. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point
or path; the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 87. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and
Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.

403

A1VA-2 Graph 88. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad
and Tobago. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the
grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates
the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 89. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 90. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 91. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of
America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path; the grey
lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa indicates the
slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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A1VA-2 Graph 92. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
States of America. The dotted line indicates the criterion for a “high” data point or path;
the grey lines indicate the criterion for variability; the number along the abscissa
indicates the slope of the line-of-best-fit for this trend.
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Appendix E: IOA Training Materials Version 3.0
IOA Rubric
(1) Determine the level.
High: the last three data paths trend at or above 80%.
Low: one or more of the last three data paths trend below 80%.
(2) Determine the variability.
Stable: one or fewer data points fully cross the constraint lines.
Variable: two or more data points fully cross the constraint lines.
(3) Determine the trend.
No-trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is between 0.1 and -0.1.
Ascending trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is above 0.1.
Descending trend: the slope of the trend’s line-of-best-fit is below -0.1.
(4) Write the findings.
For example:
(i)

“A low stable ascending trend,”

(ii)

“A high variable no-trend,”

(iii)

“A low stable no-trend,”

(iv)

“A high variable descending trend.”
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Practice Graphs

Practice Graph 1. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph as a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 2. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Antigua and
Barbuda. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 3. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Australia. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 4. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Australia.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 5. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Austria. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 6. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Austria. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 7. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Barbados. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 8. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Barbados.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 9. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Belgium. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 10. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Belgium.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 11. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Brazil. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 12. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Brazil. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low variable descending trend.

421

Practice Graph 13. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Canada. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 14. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Canada.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 15. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Columbia. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 16. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Columbia.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 17. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Costa Rica. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 18. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Costa Rica.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 19. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Denmark. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 20. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Denmark.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 21. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Dominica. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 22. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Dominica.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 23. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in El Salvador. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 24. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in El
Salvador. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 25. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Finland. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 26. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Finland.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 27. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in France. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 28. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in France. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 29. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Germany. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 30. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Germany.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 31. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Grenada. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 32. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Grenada.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 33. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 34. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala
under compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 35. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Guatemala without
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 36. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Guatemala
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 37. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Honduras. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 38. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Honduras.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 39. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Iceland. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 40. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Iceland.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 41. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in India. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 42. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in India. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 43. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Ireland. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.

452

Practice Graph 44. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Ireland.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 45. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Israel. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 46. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Israel. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 47. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 48. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Italy under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 49. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 50. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Italy without
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 51. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Jamaica. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 52. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Jamaica.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 53. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Japan. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 54. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Japan. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable ascending trend.

463

Practice Graph 55. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Liechtenstein. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 56. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Liechtenstein. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers
were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 57. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Luxembourg. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 58. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in
Luxembourg. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers
were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 59. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Malta. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 60. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Malta. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 61. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Mexico. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 62. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Mexico.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low variable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 63. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 64. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a high stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 65. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 66. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Netherlands
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 67. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in New Zealand. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a high stable ascending trend.

476

Practice Graph 68. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in New
Zealand. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 69. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Norway. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 70. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Norway.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.

479

Practice Graph 71. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Paraguay. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 72. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Paraguay.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 73. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Poland. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 74. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Poland.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 75. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Kitts and
Nevis. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 76. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint Kitts
and Nevis. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 77. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Lucia. The
data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label
this graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 78. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint
Lucia. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low variable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 79. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers
were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.

488

Practice Graph 80. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 81. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Sweden. The data
values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to label this
graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 82. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Sweden.
The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were trained to
label this graph a high stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 83. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland under
compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 84. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland
under compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 85. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Switzerland
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 86. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Switzerland
without compulsory voting. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low stable no-trend.
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Practice Graph 87. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in Trinidad and
Tobago. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 88. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in Trinidad
and Tobago. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers
were trained to label this graph a low stable descending trend.
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Practice Graph 89. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 90. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
Kingdom. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low stable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 91. A graph displaying the registered voter turnout in the United States of
America. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa. Observers were
trained to label this graph a low variable ascending trend.
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Practice Graph 92. A graph displaying the estimated eligible voter turnout in the United
States of America. The data values were flipped horizontally along the abscissa.
Observers were trained to label this graph a low variable ascending trend.

501
Appendix F: Analysis 2 Visual Analysis (V2VA) Graphs

A2VA Graph 1. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2007 Australian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 2. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2010 Australian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 3. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2013 Australian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 4. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2008 Canadian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 5. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 Canadian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 6. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2015 Canadian
federal elections.
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A2VA Graph 7. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2007 Jamaican
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 8. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 Jamaican
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 9. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2016 Jamaican
general elections.

510

A2VA Graph 10. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2004 Luxembourg
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 11. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2009 Luxembourg
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 12. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2013 Luxembourg
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 13. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2005 New Zealand
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 14. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2011 New Zealand
general elections.
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A2VA Graph 15. A scatterplot displaying the relation between voter turnout and the ratio
of registered voters to polling stations within each constituency in the 2014 New Zealand
general elections.
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Appendix G: Analysis 3 Visual Analysis (V3VA) Graphs

A3VA Graph 1. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Barbados Labour
Party (circles) and Democratic Labour Party (diamonds) across Barbadian general
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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A3VA Graph 2. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Jamaica Labour
Party (circles) and People's National Party (diamonds) across Jamaican general elections.
Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national government. Phase
lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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A3VA Graph 3. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Progressive
Citizens’ Party (circles) and Patriotic Union (diamonds) across Liechtenstein general
elections. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.
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A3VA Graph 4. An repeating A-B graph displaying popular vote for the Democratic Party
(circles) and Republican Party (diamonds) across presidential elections in the United
States of America. Filled data-points represent the party that hold power of the national
government. Phase lines represent a change in power from one party to the other.

